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D A V I D L. G H E R E

ASSIMILATION, TERMINATION, OR TRIBAL
REJUVENATION: MAINE INDIAN AFFAIRS
IN THE 1950s

The conclusion of the French and Indian wars brought an
end to a long period in which Maine Indians played an inde
pendent role in the state’s history. After nearly a century of
warfare only the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy tribes re
mained intact on tribal land, and most of this land was subse
quently ceded to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts by trea
ties in 1784, 1786, and 1818. By right of colonial precedent
Massachusetts administered the affairs of the Penobscot and
Passamaquoddy tribes until 1820, at which time this adminis
tration was transferred to the newly formed State of Maine.
Between 1830 and 1860, factional disputes within both tribes
made it impossible for the tribal governments to function.
During this chaotic period, the state and its agents accrued
more and more control over the Indians and finally imposed
compromises to resolve the most divisive issues. Although tri
bal factionalism wained after 1860, the state did not return any
authority to the tribal governments. For the next century, a
state agent handled Indian affairs in accordance with the
Indian laws in the state legal code with little or no consultation
with tribal leaders, who were unable to regain any of their
previous authority. State policies were predicated on the
assumption that the tribes would gradually disintegrate as
individuals chose to leave the reservation and enter into the
surrounding society.1
The 1960s saw a decisive change in the conduct of Indian
affairs, and indeed a change in the Indians’ own determination
to exert themselves in state politics. By 1965, state policy makers
no longer assumed that the tribes would surely disintegrate,
and Maine became the first state to establish a Department of
Indian Affairs. Late in the decade the Passamaquoddy tribe,
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joined subsequently by the Penobscot tribe and the Maliseet
band in the H oulton area, gained nationwide attention by
initiating federal lawsuits that resulted in one of the largest
Indian land claims settlements in American history. The Indi
ans’ political resurgence won them a sizeable cash settlement,
large additions in tribal real estate, and hopes for a stronger
hand in shaping their own destinies.
T he beginnings of this political reawakening can be traced
to events in the 1950s. Early in the decade young Indian veter
ans of World War II infused the tribes with a better under
standing of white society and a stronger interest in Indian
culture and heritage. A more distinct source of Indian unity,
however, came from outside political forces. Seeking to speed
assimilation of individual Indians into white society, state
administrators introduced legislation to terminate the tribal
governments and the reservations themselves. The termination
threat galvanized support — at least temporarily — behind the
new tribal leaders, who were able to block the objectives of the
state administrators. Ironically, it was the crisis brought on by
proposals to dissolve tribal political structures that laid the
basis for increasing tribal authority and provided the ideas,
methods, and spirit with which the tribes later successfully
pursued their land claims cases.
Conflicts over personal issues, religion, education, and
tribal leadership had been a political stumbling block for
Maine Indians since the early nineteenth century. During the
1820s and 1830s both tribes were split along kinship lines into
factions labeled in both cases the Old party and the New party.
Violent internal tribal disputes characterized the next few
decades and prompted members of the Passamaquoddy New
party to abandon their Pleasant Point reservation and establish
a new village in Indian township, seventy miles away. A series
of compromises initiated by the state in the 1850s and 1860s
finally resolved the most divisive issues. For the Passama
quoddy Indians, for instance, these included alternating tribal
elections between the two reservations. The disputes gradually
became less emotional; an increasing number of Indians
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M aine Indians in the twentieth century. Above: the Indian Island ferry about
1920, w ith the Penobscot Indian reservation in the background. Below: a 1932
Passam aquoddy celebration at Indian T ow nship. Maine State Museum and
the Sm ithsonian Institution.
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became independent of either faction and, ultimately, the for
mal political parties were disbanded.2 Divisiveness, however,
remained characteristic of tribal politics.
A second political stumbling block was the state’s percep
tion of its responsibility toward the two tribes. State adminis
trators viewed Indian affairs as a problem of individual rather
than tribal welfare. From 1933 to 1965, Indian administration
was the responsibility of the commissioner of health and wel
fare, a doctor of medicine. Under his guidance, a single Indian
agent (two after 1952) administered state policy as a social
worker in the Bureau of Social Welfare. Hiram Hall, who
served in this position from 1946 to 1965, had previously been a
fish inspector for the Department of Fish and Wildlife. The
absence of any office or subdepartment of Indian affairs and the
lack of relevant training and experience for the administrators
of Indian policy was indicative of the state’s disregard for issues
other than individual welfare. Furthermore, state investiga
tions of Indian affairs focused almost exclusively on topics of
health, housing, education, and welfare and showed no recog
nition of the Indians as a political or ethnic entity.3Agent Hall
sought to interact with the Indians as individual welfare recip
ients and avoided or ignored contacts with tribal leaders. His
office discouraged traditional crafts and prom oted offreservation employment and residence. Those receiving special
training under state auspices were required to pursue their
trade in white communities. Although Hall was reasonably
generous to the elderly or infirm, he was tightfisted with
unem ployed Indians who were reluctant to abandon the
reservation.4
Traditionally, state regulations were predicated upon this
individualistic approach to Indian affairs, the underlying
assumption being that ultimately individual Indians would be
assimilated into the larger population and that the tribes
would be disbanded. Tribal membership by birth or adoption
was officially limited to individuals who were at least onequarter Indian. Those who moved off the reservation had to
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conduct an annual renewal process to maintain their member
ship, while those who remained on the reservation were inelig
ible to vote in local, state, or national elections. Free hunting
and fishing licenses (a treaty right) were awarded only to indi
viduals if both parents had been Indians. Education on the
reservations was supervised by the adjacent local school sys
tems and all classes were taught in English. A law adopted in
1941 denied tribal status to anyone whose spouse was less than
one-quarter Indian. This policy, which would have dissolved
the tribe in a generation, was so severe that it was repealed in
1947.5
Tribal governments in 1950 consisted of a few spokesmen
who had no authority to make decisions. Although each tribe
elected a governor, lieutenant governor, and a legislative repre
sentative every two years, these leaders were denied the respon
sibilities routinely exercised by similar officials in white com
munities. Indigent relief, street repair, zoning, building codes,
schools, parks and recreation, canine control, and law
enforcement were all administered by the state. The Indians
had no control over the leasing of their reservation lands. Nor
did they control the funds generated from these contracts. In
fact, the Passamaquoddy had no decision-making power what
soever, while the authority of Penobscot leaders was limited to
the adoption of new tribal members. The Penobscot governor
had been allowed to select the operator of the Old Town-Indian
Island ferry, but in 1945 this prerogative was given to the
commissioner of health and welfare. Each tribe also had a
council of leaders to advise the governor, but these remnants of
traditional Indian governments were not even recognized by
the state until 1967.6
Despite minuscule official responsibilities, however, some
Indian leaders became effective spokesmen and political organ
izers, able to influence official policy through personal corres
pondence, petition drives, and the drafting of legislation. The
role of the tribal legislative representatives best illustrates the
Indian leaders’ ability to exercise informal power by utilizing
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the tribes’ few remaining privileges. Traditionally, tribal
representatives had been assigned seats in the state legislature
and could join in debate, although they were not allowed to
initiate legislation or vote. In 1941 their seating and speaking
privileges were removed and they were reduced to the status of
observers. Still, the representatives were able to inform their
tribes of upcoming legislation and provide advice on dealing
with the state bureaucracy. Moreover, they lobbied with state
leaders for or against particular bills and enlisted the help of
legislators to submit tribal proposals.7
Despite the active lobbying efforts of tribal legislative
representatives and other Indian leaders, state agencies stepped
up the campaign for assimilation in the late 1940s and early
1950s. These efforts reflected a new mood in American society
at large. Military success in World War II, economic prosperity,
scientific advances, a fervent belief in the advantages of democ
racy, and a perceived absence of social problems all contrib
uted to a nationwide feeling of optimism and self-congratula
tion. From an ethnocentric white perspective, Indian policy in
the 1950s could do no better than to speed the assimilation of
individual tribal members into this larger prosperous and
democratic world. Many state administrators considered the
continued maintenance of poverty-stricken reservations dis
graceful; Indians were encouraged to discard their tribal
structures and culture and embrace the rights, privileges, and
economic advantages of white society.8
The acceptability — indeed inevitability — of tribal disin
tegration permeated all aspects of Maine Indian policy, which
was to be “directed toward a more complete assim ilation” of
Indians into society, with the “ultimate goal”of doing away
with the tribal reservations. Regulations were designed to
promote these ends, and any enhancement to the tribal
governments’ organization or authority was perceived as an
obstacle. In sum, state policy concerned only the individual
needs of the 632 Penobscots living on the Indian Island reserva
tion and of the 607 Passamaquoddies occupying the reserva
tions at Pleasant Point and Peter Dana’s Point. Tribal matters,
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as such, were not considered, and those Indians residing off the
reservation were assumed to be already integrated into white
society.9
The goal of assimilation was attractive to many Indians as
well as to whites. Certain factions in both tribes sought even
tual integration into white society and supported the general
goals and conduct of state policy. They viewed welfare pro
grams as a form of dependency and urged stricter limitations.
They believed the state's responsibility was best limited to
welfare for the aged, infirm, and needy and opposed efforts to
expand the administrative bureaucracy.10 On the other hand, a
small but influential nucleus of reformers in each tribe voiced
strong opposition to the state assimilation policy and advo
cated fundamental increases in the autonomy and authority of
the tribal governments. They too resented the Indians’ status as
welfare cases and pointed out that state “aid” was derived from
the Indian trust funds or the leasing of Indian lands. The
reformers advocated a new Department of Indian Affairs,
which would deal with Indians as a distinct ethnic group.11
The controversies over assimilation and tribal autonomy
divided the Penobscot tribe along the factional lines remaining
from the old nineteenth-century disputes. The nucleus of active
Penobscot reformers were descendants of Old party members,
and the principal leaders all belonged to the extended family of
the party’s founder, John Neptune. The reformers were prim ar
ily Baptist and, like their ancestors, objected to the influence
of the Catholic Church, particularly on the reservation schools.
Those who defended the state's assimilation policy, on the
other hand, were generally Catholics and, like their New party
ancestors, wanted to limit the state's role in their lives. The
reform group, although its members constituted only about 20
percent of the tribe, was far better organized than their oppo
nents, and their arguments, influence, and (according to their
critics) intim idation secured the election of their partisans to
the top tribal positions from 1948 until 1962.12
The geographic separation of the Passamaquoddy parties
resulted in a different situation, with the two Passamaquoddy
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reservations each split into opposing factions by the 1850s. The
Passamaquoddy factions were delineated in large part by their
relationship with the Indian agent. Families that benefited
from Hiram H all’s authority and welfare distribution gener
ally defended state policy and administration, while those that
did not were either critical or indifferent. Interestingly, whereas
Penobscot reformers were descended from the Old party,
Passamaquoddy reformers were most successful among resi
dents of Indian Township, who were descendants of New party
members.13
Nevertheless, the bulk of each tribe showed no strong
allegiance to either faction. Depending upon the issue and the
persuasiveness of the arguments, the division of political sup
port for each group could vary. The tribal governor, no matter
which faction he represented, was inevitably opposed by a large
portion of his tribe. This discord limited the effectiveness of
Indian spokesmen and contributed to the confusion of those
whites sympathetic to Indian problems.14
Passamaquoddy reform leaders proved to be less effective
in state politics than their Penobscot counterparts. The
depressed economic conditions around the Passamaquoddy
reservations increased the Indians’ dependence upon H all’s
assistance. More importantly, the alternation of elections
between the two reservations prevented any continuity in Pas
samaquoddy leadership. Also, the legislative session com
menced only two months after the tribal elections; new officers
had little time to acquaint themselves with the mechanics of
state government.
Policies designed to accelerate the pace of assimilation in
the late 1940s brought protests from Indian leaders and the
beginnings of a coherent Indian reform movement. Consider
ing the importance of the agent in both state policy and tribal
politics, it is not surprising that early reform efforts focused on
replacing Hiram Hall. The Passamaquoddy, led by Represen
tative George Stevens of Indian Township, sent five petitions
requesting H all’s dismissal to the state governor between
December 30, 1948, and February 1, 1950. The Penobscots dis
patched a similar petition in March of 1949 and later voiced
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their complaints to John Welch, assistant to Governor Freder
ick G. Payne. Both tribes were highly critical of H all’s abusive
language, arrogant attitude, arbitrary use of authority, and
preferential distribution of state aid. Many were angered by his
refusal to attend tribal council meetings or to meet with tribal
leaders. Furthermore, the Penobscots alleged that Hall ignored
his obligation to remove white trespassers living on the
reservations.15
The commissioner of health and welfare defended Hall
and informed Governor Payne that the agent was to be com
mended on the improvements in reservation conditions.
Commissioner Stevens characterized H all’s actions as consis
tent with the state’s assimilation policy and dismissed the dis
satisfied Indians as ungrateful welfare recipients. Claiming that
the only whites on the reservation were the spouses of Indians,
Stevens suggested that the reform leaders were using the issue to
intimidate members of the opposition faction. The governor
accepted these rebuttals and took no immediate action. How
ever, the Indian complaints did prom pt numerous investiga
tions into state policy.16
Official Passamaquoddy protests against Hall declined
after this unsuccessful effort to secure his removal. In the
October 1950 elections, the Pleasant Point reservation selected
tribal leaders who were less critical of state policies and offi
cials. The Penobscots, on the other hand, reelected reform
leaders who continued to protest H all’s refusal to remove white
trespassers and initiated two unsuccessful legislative attempts
to shift this responsibility to other state officials.17The conflict
between the Penobscot leaders and Hall was finally resolved
after Penobscot Governor Albert Nicola voiced the tribe’s com
plaints to the local news media in April 1952. Repeating the
familiar charges, Nicola protested H all’s failure to consult
with the tribe on Indian issues and claimed a “showdown”
between the tribe and the state was im m inent.18This publicity
prompted Commissioner Stevens to begin interviewing pro
spective agents to replace Hall. Governor Payne, however,
refused to dismiss an obligation to a loyal employee. Sadie
Mitchell, a Penobscot favoring state policy, was appointed
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agent to her own tribe, and Hall was retained as Passamaquoddy agent, where he remained for the next eleven years.19
These same years saw a quickening of political activity in
other areas as reform factions in each tribe sought to eliminate
objectionable aspects of state policy through legislation. Start
ing in 1949 the tribal councils sent a series of bills to the
legislature. The proposals were discussed and ratified by the
council and given to the tribal representative, who arranged for
a legislator to submit them. While there was little coordination
between the three reservations in formulating these bills, the
two Indian representatives usually cooperated closely in
Augusta.20
Although all of the reform efforts during these early years
failed, they brought a growing awareness among tribal leaders
of the need for political autonomy. Legislative attempts to
secure the tribes’ perceived treaty rights, in fact, enjoyed wide
spread support among the Indians and focused the attention of
tribal leaders on the origins of Indian privileges in the original
treaties with Massachusetts and Maine. These treaties, for
instance, had repeatedly promised the unhindered “privilege of
fishing, hunting, and fowling.” However, the final Passamaquoddy treaty (1794) only mentioned fishing while the last set
of Penobscot treaties (1818, 1820) failed altogether to address
the topic.21 The Indians claimed that they had never relin
quished these privileges, while the state countered that omis
sion of the game rights in the later treaties relieved the state of
any obligation. In 1951, 1953, and again in 1955 the Indians
had legislation introduced to extend free hunting and fishing
licenses to tribal members previously denied this right due to
mixed parentage. The proposals were defeated in all three
legislatures.22
Another treaty right claimed by many Indians was free
medical care. It is unclear how this perception originated, as
the topic was not discussed in any of the treaties. Nevertheless,
the numerous medical bills and accompanying letters received
by Commissioner Stevens during the late 1940s and early 1950s
clearly indicate that many Indians shared this belief. The state’s
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rejection of this point of view prompted unsuccessful legisla
tive efforts to mandate state medical aid for all Indians.23
The most persistent treaty conflict with the state concerned
the loss of land reserved for Indian use. The Passamaquoddy
tribe had never received the islands in the St. Croix River prom 
ised in the 1794 treaty because Massachusetts had sold them
prior to the treaty. The Penobscots lost the Penobscot River
islands above Mattawamkeag because the State of Maine mis
interpreted the provisions of the 1818 treaty. Additionally, in
1833 the Penobscots were defrauded of four townships reserved
for them. Twice during the late 1800s the Indians tried to resolve
these problems but to no avail. State confiscation and sale of
reservation land during the late 1940s and early 1950s triggered
a new Indian initiative when the tribes proposed a commission
to examine various individual and tribal land claims. In 1955,
the legislature rejected this proposal too, but the continuing
agitation for reinstitution of original treaty rights laid the
foundation for stronger land claims in the next decades.24
In contrast to the widespread support on issues of treaty
rights, the tribes divided into factions on most of the other
legislative reforms. The most important of these proposed the
creation of a state Department of Indian Affairs. This would
have transferred authority from the state’s welfare-minded
administrators to a new agency focused on (and, presumably,
more responsive to) the full range of Indian problems. How
ever, a separate state agency for Indians and a recognition of
their nonwelfare concerns would have contradicted the policy
of individual assimilation. Thus this bill was defeated when it
was submitted in 1949, 1953, and 1955.25
The Penobscot reform faction assumed a leading role in
efforts to enhance tribal government authority. All of its efforts
were defeated, however. Proposals that would have allowed the
tribe to appoint its own constable and to license reservation
dogs were offered to the legislature in 1951 with no success. A
bill transferring the duty of recording Indian deaths from the
agent to tribal officials was likewise voted down. Two years
later, the state legislature refused to allow the Penobscot tribal
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council to conduct the annual census. Also, when the Indians
were finally given voting privileges in 1955, the administration
of the reservation precincts was entrusted to adjacent town
governments rather than to tribal officials.26
The most im portant request made by the Penobscots con
cerned control over leasing their lands and the expenditure of
the resulting funds. Governor Nicola considered jurisdiction
over Indian lands the major vehicle for increased tribal auton
omy. As matters stood, the state placed revenue from timber
harvests on reservation lands in a special tribal trust, which the
legislature could allocate for reservation improvements. Tradi
tionally, the interest from these funds had been used by the
agent to provide welfare. However, after 1945 the interest was
deposited in the state treasury, and subsequent welfare pay
ments assumed the appearance of state aid.27Between 1949 and
1953, the Penobscots attempted in various ways to gain control
over the funds. After several attempts to reroute the funds
through the tribal governments, in 1953 the Indians drafted
two bills that would have distributed all funds generated from
Indian land evenly to each tribe member. This proposal too
was rejected by the legislature.28
The Passamaquoddy were somewhat less active on these
issues of tribal authority. They did support the proposals for
tribal appointm ent of constables and tribal control over trust
funds, and Tribal Governor William Altevater (an indepen
dent) sought unsuccessfully to impose a curfew and a dog tax in
1955. However, Passamaquoddy reform energies were spent
primarily on the continuing battle with Agent Hall. Criticisms
voiced repeatedly throughout the period suggest that the cam
paign from Pleasant Point made little headway.29
This litany of denied reforms appears to portray the Maine
legislature of the early 1950s as conservative, dogmatic, and
resistant to change. In actuality, the legislature questioned
state policy and initiated three separate investigations. Repre
sentative David Fuller was dispatched to the Institute on Amer
ican Indian Assimilation and returned with numerous sugges
tions for prom oting assimilation of individual Indians. Frank
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Haynes, director of social welfare, conducted a lengthy study of
state policy and expenditures going back to 1821. Lastly,
Commissioner Stevens evaluated the reservations and recom
mended methods of improving living conditions and speeding
the assim ilation process. Concurrently, Governor Payne
initiated two separate evaluations of the Penobscot tribe’s griev
ances, which emphasized the internal tribal dissension and
portrayed the Indian reformers as an insignificant minority
faction. In addition, Commissioner Stevens brought the state’s
actions and policies to the attention of the Bureau of Indian
Affairs in Washington and sought their advice. The agency
congratulated Stevens on his conduct and confirmed the con
currence of state and federal Indian policy.30
T hat none of the above reports seriously questioned over
all state policy is a testimony to the pervasive feeling during the
decade that assimilation into white society was the enlightened
and progressive course for Indian affairs.31 On the rare occa
sions that Indian affairs received attention from newspaper
editors, individual assimilation and tribal termination were
inevitably the themes. On January 11, 1956, for instance, the
Portland Press Herald claimed, “The goal [of state Indian
policy] should be eventual first-class citizenship for the Indi
ans, placing on them the same privileges as everyone else. The
reservation has no place in this civilized age.”32 In fact, inde
pendent reports issued by the Indian Rights Association, the
Portland Catholic Archdiocese, and the Maine Council of
Churches’ Social Action Committee either endorsed the state’s
practices or indeed urged more rapid assimilation.33
All of these reports were considered by a Legislative
Research Committee on Indian Affairs during the 1951-1952
legislature. This committee’s findings wholeheartedly em
braced assimilation/term ination while focusing primarily on
issues of welfare. To expedite the assimilation process, the
committee advocated state purchase of reservation lands, revi
sion of certain state laws, and education of Indian children in
nearby white schools. The Penobscot proposal for a state
Department of Indian Affairs was rejected, but the committee
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recommended that Commissioner Stevens be authorized to
appoint a Director of Indian Affairs within the Department of
Health and Welfare. The legislature enacted this proposal dur
ing the 1953 session, but Commissioner Stevens and his succes
sor, Dean Fisher, chose not to make the appointment. The
position appeared on government “line and block” charts, but
in fact no change occurred.34
One reform recommended by nearly all of the reports and
investigations was the granting of voting rights to the Indians.
In response, the Maine Legislature extended suffrage in
county, state, and national elections to the reservation Indians
in 1955, being the next to last state in the nation to do so.
However, Indian reaction to this reform provides another indi
cation of the dissension within the tribes. Passamaquoddy
Governor William Altevater praised the act as “one of the best
things that has ever happened” and recognized voting as an
im portant privilege and a potential means for improving his
tribe’s welfare. The majority of Penobscot leaders, on the other
hand, recognized that the small number of Indian voters, split
as they were, would have little impact on the elections. Further
more, some feared that the state government might claim that
Indians were adequately represented by the new voting privi
leges and attempt to abolish the tribal governments.35
The assim ilation/term ination program was advanced
significantly in late 1954 when Dean Fisher, a doctor of medi
cine, was appointed to replace David Stevens as Commissioner
of Health and Welfare. Fisher endorsed assimilation and
claimed that state policies, coupled with educational oppor
tunities, economic pressures, and intermarriage, would even
tually bring an end to the tribal reservations. Fisher pursued
this objective aggressively, encouraged by the general
ethnocentricism implicit in public attitudes toward the Indi
ans. His aims were augmented by a comprehensive review of all
aspects of state government initiated by Governor Edmund S.
Muskie in 1956 and conducted by the prestigious Public
Administration Service of Chicago. The section on Indian
Affairs concurred with the state’s practice of administering
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Indian affairs through the Bureau of Social Welfare, but casti
gated the state for the “squalor” in which many Indians lived
and “for allowing the reservation system to continue into mod
ern times.” The Public Administration Service urged a more
aggressive policy “to abolish the reservation segregation sys
tem and absorb the Indian population into normal community
life.” It suggested that restricted eligibility for reservation
rights and the elimination of some of the state’s treaty com
mitments might be conducive to this goal.36
Armed w ith these recom mendations, Com m issioner
Fisher proposed a series of resolutions to the legislature in 1957
that would have reduced tribal membership and discouraged
residence on the reservation. One would have transferred
authority over tribal adoptions from the Indians to the state
governor and council. Another sought to repeal the state
requirement to return destitute Indians to the reservation. A
third would have disallowed the inheritance of reservation land
and eliminated the means for nonreservation Indians to retain
their tribal status. Still another bill sought to empower judges
with discretion to remove individuals (Indian and non-Indian)
from the reservation.37
Far more controversial, however, was Fisher s proposal to
eliminate both the reservations and the tribal governments.
This new termination policy was to be accomplished by con
verting the reservations into unorganized territory and by
repealing various laws which distinguished between Indian
and white residents. Persons residing in each area would then
be governed equally — tribal members and white trespassers —
according to the laws for unorganized territories. These new
governments would replace the tribal governments. Many tri
bal leadership positions were specifically cited for elimination,
and, as unorganized territory, the unoccupied land would be
open to purchase by anyone.38
Fisher s legislative proposals encountered unified opposi
tion from the Indians. Several months earlier both tribes had
elected members of the reform factions to the positions of
governor and legislative representative. The state’s termination
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policy angered these leaders, but, more importantly, it alien
ated many Indians who had previously endorsed the state
policy of gradual assimilation. Consequently, a large majority
in each tribe supported the leaders’ strident opposition to
Fisher's proposals. This rare consensus gave the new reform
leaders an effectiveness no Indian leader had previously en
joyed.39
The Indians were first informed of Fisher’s plans by their
legislative representatives in late January 1957. During the
following weeks both tribal councils conducted lengthy discus
sions concerning the proposals and strategies for defeating
them. Both tribes drafted petitions to Governor Muskie and to
the legislature attacking the new policy and objecting to the
lack of consultation with the Indians. The tribal councils
exchanged observers to coordinate their actions and the tribal
representatives increased their lobbying efforts.40 Indian lead
ers sought the support of state religious organizations, and in
early March the Penobscots hired a lawyer to argue their case
before the legislature. Just prior to legislative hearings on the
bills, the two tribes held a joint news conference to publicly
protest state policy. After explaining the implications of
Fisher’s bills, various Indian leaders voiced stern opposition to
the state’s effort to “abolish 1,200 people and set them adrift.”41
The Penobscots responded to the termination crisis by
initiating some proposals of their own. One bill sought to
strengthen tribal authority by transferring responsibility for
appointing Indian constables from the state governor to the
tribal governors, while another would have authorized the use
of $4,000 of tribal funds to defend Indian rights. In addition,
they endorsed Fisher's bill granting judges discretion to remove
individuals from the reservation, but recommended an amend
ment to require the appropriate tribe’s recommendation. This
would not only shift authority to the Indian leaders but might
also serve as a means of eliminating white trespassers.42
All of Fisher's proposals and those initiated by the Penob
scots were referred to the legislature’s Joint Standing Commit
tee on Welfare. A delegation of Indians representing both tribes
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T he above occasion marks the first meeting of the C oalition of Eastern Native
Americans, held November 1972 in W ashington, D.C. Delegates to the gath
ering included Passamaquoddy, Penobscot, Micmac, and Maliseet Indians.
Sm ithsonian Institution.

and all political factions presented their views to the committee
on March 26. Penobscot Representative John Nelson charged
that the state proposed "to liquidate the entire tribe as a
nation.” Passamaquoddy Representative George Stevens con
demned the state’s refusal to cooperate with tribal leaders on
Indian issues. Taking a different tack, Penobscot Councilman
Leo Shay claimed that assimilation was inevitable but should
be accomplished through education rather than abolition of
the reservations. Some leaders claimed to be seeking only to
postpone legislation for further consideration; another bluntly
ordered the legislators to "leave our laws alone.”43
Penobscot attorney James Murphy presented a more for
mal argument to the committee — an argument that foreshad
owed the land claims of the 1970s in both scope and appeal.
Murphy claimed that the tribe was “a free nation and a free
people, subject to certain treaty obligations,” and that the state
could "not legislate unilaterally as to the Penobscot nation, its
lands or its existence.” Requesting a moratorium on the bills,
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Murphy threatened to appeal to President Eisenhower, Con
gress, or even the United Nations. He closed by claiming that
the tribe would ‘‘take any and all peaceful steps necessary to
preserve their nation as a free nation, their people as a free
people.”44
The Indians were not the only ones heard by the commit
tee. Commissioner Fisher testified that the bills only elimi
nated obsolete or conflicting laws which had been passed dur
ing the previous century. Codification, he argued, would make
the reservations eligible for additional state funds. Its intent was
‘‘to make the Indians full-fledged citizens with the same rights
as other citizens.” On the other hand, Frederick Payne, ex
governor of Maine, claimed that since the bills concerned the
Indians’ land and lives, the committee should listen to them.
This view was echoed by a few religious leaders whose support
had been recruited by the Indians.45
The unity of Indian opinion and the effectiveness of their
tactics, which included petitions, testimony, lobbying efforts,
publicity, and recruitment of non-Indian supporters, won over
the legislature. In early April, all of the legislation that the
Indians had opposed was either withdrawn or reported unfa
vorably out of the welfare committee. Moreover, the committee
endorsed changes that would permit tribes to appoint consta
bles and require tribal approval before a judge could remove an
individual from the reservation. However, the committee
rejected the allocation of tribal funds to defend Indian rights.
The tribal representatives continued their lobbying efforts and,
in late April, secured passage of the two proposals approved by
the committee. The legislature rejected all the remaining legis
lation in accordance with the welfare committee’s recom
mendations.46
The defeat of Commissioner Fisher’s initiatives elimi
nated the threat of termination, but the state policy of individ
ual assimilation remained intact. Welfare administrators con
tinued to perceive the Indians only as welare recipients and the
Indian agents continued to ignore tribal leaders, discourage
tribal crafts, and promote emigration from the reservations.
Fisher opposed further legislative reforms in the early 1960s
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and complained that the press focused too much on Indian
problems. Indians, he argued, received “more assistance than
ordinary welfare cases.” Hall agreed that the Indians had “a
better set up than white people,” and revealed that he kept “the
food down so that they [would] try to work.”47
The campaign for tribal autonomy was far from over. The
termination crisis had radicalized a number of Indian leaders,
particularly among the Penobscots. Spokesmen began to refer
to themselves as “the Penobscot N ation” and to dispute the
state’s right to pass legislation affecting them. Two lengthy
Penobscot council meetings in late May 1957 were devoted to
the tribe’s rights as a nation and to strategies for regaining
tribal sovereignty. During the following months, the Penob
scots changed the tribal governor’s title to tribal chief and
began referring to Indian Island by its Penobscot name, Burnurwurbskek. In September, Chief Ranco informed the state of
the tribe’s desire for separate-nation status, and the following
May delegates to the United Nations were selected. Although
patently unacceptable to the state, such actions suggest a remark
able change in Indian attitudes following the termination
crisis.48
The firm Indian consensus that had emboldened tribal
leaders in the late 1950s gradually disappeared as the threat of
termination receded. Some Indians may have been alienated by
the radicals, while others simply resumed their traditional
support of gradual assimilation. By the early 1960s, the two
tribes were again evenly divided over opposition to state poli
cies. In a bitter 1962 political contest, a one-vote majority
elected a new Penobscot governor who was a vigorous defender
of state policies. The Passamaquoddy governor, on the other
hand, proved to be so critical of state policies that numerous
tribe members launched a campaign for his removal. This
discord was exacerbated by the fact that each tribe’s legislative
representative held views opposite those of his respective
governor.49
Although the drive for tribal autonomy was temporarily
eclipsed by resurgent factionalism, Fisher’s initiatives never
theless marked a turning point in the legislature’s attitude
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towards the Indians. Gradually over the next few years the
legislature began to respond to the demands of the Indian
reformers. The two Penobscot proposals enacted during the
termination crisis were followed in 1959 by the extension of free
hunting and fishing licenses to all members of either tribe.
Four years later, the Penobscot government was authorized to
pass and enforce local ordinances and to utilize the funds
generated from dog licenses and automobile taxes on their
reservation. The following legislature extended most of these
powers to the Passamaquoddy tribe.50
Creation of the Maine Department of Indian Affairs in
1965 confirmed the legislature’s growing distance from the
policies of termination and forced assimilation. The agency
had been recommended by a legislative research committee
whose report acknowledged that most Indians took “pride in
their blood and heritage and desire[d] to remain Indians.”51
The research committee expressed doubts that the tribes would
ever disintegrate or that individual Indians would become fully
assimilated. It also criticized past legislatures for ignoring
many Indian grievances while concentrating on welfare issues.
The committee recommended that the state provide “every
assistance” for tribal members “to advance in all facets of living
... [while retaining] their identity as Indians.”52
There were, of course, broader reasons for the Indians’
legislative successes during the early 1960s. The national civil
rights movement, the proliferation of white liberal Indian
advocates, and a shift in the assumptions and perceptions of
white society all played a role in the gradual abandonment of
an active assimilation policy. But state and tribal politics,
charged by the tensions of the termination crisis, carried their
own dynamic as well. April 1957 marked both the last legisla
tive efforts to undermine tribal integrity and the first enactment
of Indian-sponsored reform legislation.
Historians of American politics have labeled the 1950s a
“crucial decade,” a time of subtle changes that blossomed into
lively political debate later in the 1960s and 1970s. During the
1950s the Maine Indians successfully defended their tribal
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integrity and reservation land when they were in the greatest
peril. This victory was largely due to the tribal representatives
at the legislature, unique to Maine, who alerted the tribes,
organized effective opposition, and utilized their legislative
contacts to secure the defeat of Fisher s designs. Moreover, the
1950s was an important gestation period for the ideas, methods,
and tactics that the tribes used later to resolve im portant politi
cal grievances. During the 1960s, a series of Indian sponsored
legislative initiatives to enhance tribal authority, expand eligi
bility for treaty rights, and create a Department of Indian
Affairs was enacted into law. All of these reforms had their
origin in the tribal council meetings and the defeated legisla
tive resolutions of the early 1950s.

Indian tribal leaders like Passamaquoddy Governor John Stevens pushed to
liberalize state adm inistration of the two reservations. T h e reform issues of
the 1950 s laid a foundation for the land claims cases of the next two decades.
Sm ithsonian Institution.
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The Maine Indian land claims had more direct connec
tions with this crucial decade. The issue had been raised repeat
edly in the tribal council meetings and in defeated legislation
during the 1950s and early 1960s. The state’s reluctance to
consider this grievance, coupled w ith a new incident,
prompted the Passamaquoddy to seek a judicial resolution in
the late 1960s. The two principal leaders of this effort, John
Stevens and George Stevens, had been Passamaquoddy gover
nor and representative, respectively, during the termination
crisis. When the Penobscots initiated their own case in 1971,
they were led by Governor Francis Ranco who had held that
same position fourteen years earlier when he had argued
against Fisher’s proposals before the legislature. Other leaders
of both tribes had been council members or youthful observers
in the 1950s, and this shared experience was the basis for their
decisions concerning the land claims issue. Ultimately, after
lengthy legal and political maneuvering, the key judicial deci
sion, Passamaquoddy vs. Morton, in effect ruled that the fed
eral government should have had authority over Indian affairs
in Maine, not the state government. Without discounting the
enormous effort and the imaginative legal tactics required of
the Indians’ lawyers to win this case, this contention had been
voiced repeatedly during the 1950s by the reform factions in
both tribes.
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